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THE LEGALITY OF NONINSURED EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PROGRAMS
RICHARD W. DUESENBERG *
In 1962, one of the nation's leading insurers filed for approval in
Illinois a form under which its client, a major farm implement com-
pany, would itself be liable for the initial costs of its employee medical
benefits program.' Under the plan, the liability of the insurance car-
rier was retained through a provision which obligated the carrier
after claims payments by the employer reached a predetermined
dollar level. The Illinois Commissioner of Insurance approved this
application; but he did so only after announcing that no future ap-
proval would be forthcoming until a further study of such plans was
conducted. He explained that inauguration of such a program might
place a company in violation of state laws requiring the licensing of
insurers. Thus was added a wholly new dimension to be considered in
the debate over noninsured employee benefit plans.
OBJECTIVE OF NONINSURED PLANS
The magnitude of employee benefit programs, especially in terms
of cost and personnel relations, necessarily has made the choice of
how they are to be structured one for top-level decision-making. In
response to the past several years' squeeze on corporate profits, there
has been a great deal of re-thinking with respect to corporate in-
surance programming.' Recent years have witnessed a substantial
trend toward noninsured plans of varying kinds, with a number of the
nation's largest enterprises having made the decision to conduct their
programs on their own. The principal lure is savings—the hope that
by eliminating certain of the "non-claims" costs, the total price tag
on employee benefits can be reduced or contained.
Converting to noninsurance means the partial or complete elimina-
tion of the insurance carrier. The term "noninsurance" is used here in
place of the more frequent characterization of "self-insurance", which
strictly speaking is incorrectly used when employed in the context of
* B A , LL B , Valparaiso University LL.M., Yale Law School; 1956-62, Professor of
Law, New York University; Contributor to Collier on Bankruptcy and co-author of three
volumes of New York Law of Contracts; Member of Missouri Bar.
1 Future of Private Insurance in Big Group Cases Tied to Tax Bill in Next N.Y.
Legislature, The National Underwriter, Aug. 10, 1963, p. 1, col. 1. The National Under-
writer news item referred to dealt with an instance where a company undertook to be
responsible for the major part of its employee benefits, with the insurer assuming responsi-
bility for what might be termed excess coverage. The legal principles discussed in this
paper are equally applicable to a situation where an employer assumes total responsibility
for payments under its employee benefit programs, with no part being taken by a com-
mercial carrier.
2 Going It Alone With Self-Insurance, Bus. Week, July 6, 1963, p. 94.
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employee benefit programs. A company may "self-insure" its fire and
liability risks, but it does not "self-insure" its employees' health and
accident risks.
A decision to become noninsured on employee benefit programs
is not easily made. The considerations are not always the same from
company to company,' or from benefit to benefit. Size and distribution of
company plants and offices, for example, are important factors.
Without a sufficient number of employees among whom to spread the
risk, noninsurance is often not practicable, and if the company's
plants and offices are widely scattered, the problems of servicing claims
may become so burdensome and expensive as to rule out the probability
of any savings. Also important is the nature of the business activity,
for this relates directly to the problems of adequate risk selection and
control. History, too, has its influence, for certain benefits, such as
medical coverages, have more traditionally been insured, whereas
sick pay and pension plans, on the other hand, probably because
treated as salary continuance, in many companies have never been
funded through insurance.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
Before any company, regardless of size or activity, takes the step
of becoming noninsured, an examination of how it has been spending
its premium dollar should be undertaken. The principal disposition
of the premium dollar is, of course, claims payment. But the pie is
sliced into other pieces, too. Typically, that portion of the premium
dollar not utilized for claims payment is divided among:
(a) Commissions.
(b) Administrative costs—overhead, actuarial, accounting, print-
ing, etc.
(c) Reserves, among others, to cover major catastrophies.
(d) State premium taxes.
Dollars used to pay these costs are referred to as "retained dol-
lars", or in the aggregate as the "retention portion" of each year's
premium billsIt is obvious that if noninsurance is to serve the objec-
tive of cost reduction, the savings must come from one or several
of these groups.
The amount of each cost group will not be the same in every case,
for many variables affect each company's final computation. For ex-
ample, state premium taxes vary, and so do the demands which policy-
holders make on the administrative services of an insurer. Similarly,
8 Dollars retained for reserves are, of course, recoverable in case of the occurrence
of the events for which the reserves are created. In many cases, as a practical matter, the
reserve amount will never be returned, and in any case the use value of the money is
lost.
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the proportionate alignment between the categories differs from case
to case, as for example, in the case of a smaller company where the
premium tax charge is likely to be less significant in the total cost pat-
tern than is the administration charge. The opposite may be true for
a big account.
Despite the inherent individuality of each company's needs, one
thing is certain; namely, that large sums of money are involved. It is
not at all unusual for the retention figure of a sizable account to run
well in excess of a quarter or even a half million dollars.
A company cannot, however, in one great swoop, end all of these
costs by going noninsured. A great many valuable services are pur-
chased with these dollars, and noninsurance does not automatically
dispense with the need for them. Even with a company long experienced
in handling internally many of the details of administering its em-
ployee benefit programs, professional services of numerous kinds are
inevitably required and must be purchased somewhere. These services
fall generally into several reasonably definable groups, including:
(a) Actuarial.
(b) Professional administrative.
(c) Claims control.
The value of these cannot be considered lightly. Actuarial
counsel is needed, among other things, to develop the basic document
or policy establishing the benefit program. Thereafter, actuaries are
used to monitor the plan, particularly to spot developments affecting
cost. And, if a program involves share-the-cost principles—as fre-
quently they do—the services of actuaries are needed in determining
the amount of employee contributions.
Administration is a major cost item, too. Many details may, of
course, be handled by the company, even where the program is in-
sured. But the professional services used in administering a plan are
the ones that are important in terms of cost and effect upon operation.
Where claims determination and administration is company-conducted,
some observers feel that there is an increased possibility that subjective
rather than objective standards will tend to allow such costs to rise.
The development of objective claims criteria depends on the widest
possible sources of information. For this reason, the more comprehen-
sive fact-gathering machinery of an insurer or independent counsel
is likely to be more effective than anything a single company is apt to
develop internally.
Part of the program of claims cost control is that of maintaining a
ceiling for medical fees and costs. Here the services of insurance car-
riers or other professional administrators will probably be very valu-
able, since the normal corporate posture is not designed to maximize
opportunities for contact with the medical world. Large insurers, es-
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pecially, are well equipped to send representatives into the field to
deal properly with negotiations and even abuses in claims costs by
employees, hospitals or doctors.
Closely related here is the important point that an insurer is often
a very useful buffer between a company and its employees. Claims
which are disputed usually appear in a conflict in which the carrier,
not the employer, is on the other side. And it is doubtless a fact of
employee psychology that a worker is more satisfied with the check
of an insurer than with one from the boss. Some risk managers even
feel that this attitude bears directly on the accident experience of their
companies and that is an item of no little importance.
The above represent the traditionally significant factors to be
considered in weighing the pros and cons of noninsurance. Being non-
insured does not require development of internal facilities to manage the
entire creation and handling of the program. Such services are available
from a number of independent counsel, which, without being insurers,
specialize in selling expertise of this kind. The point is that inevitably
the money must be expended. The relative costs of the source—insurer
or independent counsel—is a debate this writer prefers to avoid.
THE TAX COST
One cost which definitely can be eliminated via the noninsured
route is the tax on premiums paid to the carriers. It is not unusual
for a corporation spending six to eight million dollars annually in
premiums on its health and accident insurance to pay out in excess of
$125,000 just to cover the premium taxes imposed on the carriers, who,
in turn, pass the assessment along to their clients. This figure will
go up or down, depending on many factors such as the types and ex-
tent of benefits given, the number of employees and the tax rate im-
posed by the state or states in which an employer has most of its
personnel.* On the average, however, a company may expect that
something in excess of two per cent of its premium dollar will go to
pay the premium tax, and in most large employer cases, this will be
the biggest single item in the retained dollar figure. As much as any
other single factor, this potential saving has served to whet the
appetite for noninsurance.
The American insurance indlistry is watching closely develop-
ments in this field. Many big group-writing carriers see as a contribut-
ing cause to the increasing use of noninsured programs not only the
interest of their customers in dollar savings, but also what in the eyes
4 The rates vary from state to state, and in some instances (e.g., Arkansas and
Florida) a tax is imposed on out-of-state carriers only. The general average of premium
tax rates is fractionally in excess of 2%, with the highest rate being in Oklahoma, where it
is 4% and applicable to out-of-state carriers only.
234
NONINSURED EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS
of many is an inequitable and unfair treatment of the so-called com-
mercial carriers as distinguished from the Blue Cross, Blue Shield
and other "service" companies. In almost every state "the Blues" are
subject either to no premium tax at all or to one which is substantially
less in amount than that imposed on their competitors, the commercial
carriers.' This disparity in tax treatment, it is argued, is a major factor
in the competition for employee benefit coverages.
As a result, commercial carriers have begun a long anticipated
struggle for what they regard as equitable tax treatment. Failing a
change in tax laws,' the concept of noninsured employee benefit pro-
grams offers a partial solution to the competitive handicap currently
imposed on them by the tax laws. Since an increasing amount of group
insurance is being written on a "cost-plus" basis, the concept of non-
insured plans offers to the commercial carrier the opportunity to
market its highly skilled and professional services, while writing only
excess coverage or no coverage at all. By employing high deductible
or excess coverage principles, a program can be formulated whereby the
dollar flow from client to carrier, on which is based the premium tax,
is reduced, although the profit enjoyment of the carrier and the pre-
dictable ultimate liability of the company are not affected. Any tax-
caused cost discrepancy between contracts offered by "the Blues" and
those of other carriers is narrowed and the long-standing complaints
of the commercial carrier are minimized.
Paradoxically, such a program may only be a stopping point on
the way to total noninsurance. As a cure, therefore, to the unfavorable
competitive posture of group welfare carriers, it is only second best
to the general tax relief being sought.
LEGALITY OF NONINSURANCE
It was just such a program which gave rise to the Illinois Com-
missioner's ruling referred to at the opening of this article. Almost
always, the debate over the merits of noninsurance has been waged in
economic terms. The legal issue is whether a noninsured program,
whether under some form of high deductible contract or on a 100%
basis, constitutes insurance and therefore places a company conducting
it in violation of state laws requiring the licensing of insurers.
5 Only six states levy a premium tax on Blue Cross and Blue Shield. All states impose
a tax on out-of-state carriers, and about 3/4 of the states impose a tax on domestic
insurers.
6 During 1962, bills were introduced into the legislatures of several key states for
the purpose of achieving an adjustment in tax treatment of so-called commercial carriers
with "service" organizations. The bills were not all identical, but their common objective
is tax relief. See New York Senate Bill No. 3495, Massachusetts House Bill No. 1588,
Missouri House Bills Nos. 462, 463 and Pennsylvania House Bill No. 1315. Similar
legislation was introduced and passed in Washington. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. ch. 166
(1963).
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It may seem strange to state that a noninsured plan may cause a
company to be in violation of insurance laws, particularly in view of
the long-standing existence of noninsured programs, especially in the
pension area.' The noninsured concept is not new. What is new is the
recent activity of state insurance agencies indicating that they regard
such plans as illegal unless brought within the range of their control
through the licensing of the company carrying on the plan. As a matter
of law, however, no court has ever ruled on the precise question of
whether noninsured employee benefit plans are within the scope of
regulatory insurance laws. In view of the urgency of the problem, a
close look at the law, to the extent it exists, is merited.
STATE STATUTES
The very laws which require the licensing of insurers often do
not themselves define the term "insurance", and therefore fail to set
out a legislative yardstick by which borderline activities may be meas-
ured. All states have laws regulating insurers, but in more than half
of them one will search in vain for a definition of "insurance" or "in-
surer." Some definitions are broad enough to include such common oc-
currences as guarantees or endorsements,' but nowhere is there a de-
cision that either of these constitutes insurance. Courts, too, have long
acknowledged difficulty in giving meaning to the term.
A good description of insurance, taken from statutes and judicial
decisions, would include five basic ingredients. These are:"
7 A Fund For The Republic study recently observed that in 1957, 13.2 million of
17.7 million employees covered by pension plans were under noninsured plans. Tilove,
Pension Funds and Economic Freedom (1959).
8 E.g., Cal. Ins. Code § 22, which reads: "Insurance is a contract whereby one
undertakes to indemnify against loss, damage, or liability arising from a contingent or
unknown event." See also Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.002 (1958).
9 Cf. N.Y. Ins. Law § 41. The New York statutory definition is the most explicit
and detailed among American states, and the elements set out here in the text are
embodied in its provisions. Cf. also, Commonwealth v. Vrooman, 164 Pa. 306, 30 Atl. 217
(1894), where it is said that:
The conditions necessary to the business of insurance are: (a) The existence of a
known danger to which all property owners are exposed, and against which they
cannot effectually protect themselves; (b) the strong probability that loss from
this danger will fall upon but few of those who are exposed to it; (c) the cer-
tainty that when the loss happens it will fall so heavily on those to whom it
comes as to make pecuniary indemnity a matter of great importance; (d) some
knowledge of the relative value of the property annually destroyed by fire to
serve as a basis for calculating the risk assumed by the insurer, and the amount
of the premium required to enable the insurer to meet losses and expenses and
secure a fair return for the capital employed.
Commonwealth v. Vrooman, supra at 318, 30 Atl. at 219.
The penalties vary according to state laws. E.g., in Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 375.310,
a fine of $250 is provided for each violation. "Each violation" is not defined, but pre-
sumably could be interpreted to include each contractual commitment to each employee.
N.Y. Ins. Law § 112(5) provides that any person or corporation acting for an un-
licensed insurer shall forfeit $500 for the "first offense," and an additional $500 for each
month during which such party continued to act in violation of the section.
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(a) consideration (premium),
(b) fortuitous event,
(c) a group of people with identical interests more or less equally
exposed to the same risks,
(d) a shifting of that risk to the insurer and
(e) a distribution of the risk to others similarly exposed.
If nothing more is done than to try to fit the terms of most nonin-
sured employee benefit plans into this five-part definition, it is readily
perceived that they involve engaging in insurance. This is especially
true if the employees contribute to the plan. A group medical plan for
which employees pay part of the cost, for example, transfers to the
employer each employee's risk of loss due to certain stipulated events
which are largely beyond control, and to which each employee in the
group is, in general, equally exposed. In turn, the employer may be
said to distribute this risk to all employees, who assume their propor-
tionate share of the risk in the form of contributions (premiums) paid
into the plan.
But does it necessarily follow that if a given program satisfies
each of the conditions of a legislative or judicial description of the
term, 'that this of itself should be decisive?
JUDICIAL TESTS
A look at other areas in which courts have spoken demonstrates
in general a negative response to the inquiry. Cases which have care-
fully discussed the meaning of insurance invariably proceed from the
sometimes unstated inquiry, "Why is the question being asked?" The
inquiry is appropriate, for the traditional apologia for insurance regu-
lation is that the public is in need of government protection to insure
performance when it is due. 1° As stated in one case, regulation is to
protect "the public from surrendering its money in exchange for ques-
tionable or worthless pieces of paper denominated insurance policies.""
Essentially, there are two tests used by courts in assessing the
validity of transactions alleged to be insurance. One, which may be
10 The security of policy holders requires, first, permanency in the custodian of
the funds gathered from them, and on which their indemnity in case of loss
depends; second, an honest and competent administration of these funds; third,
restraint against the division of the profits of the business whenever such divi-
sion would injuriously affect the security of policy holders.
Commonwealth v. Vrooman, supra note 9, at 318, 30 All. at 219.
11 State ex rd. Herbert v. Standard Oil Co., 138 Ohio St. 376, 381, 35 N.E.2d 437,
440 (1941). This case involved litigation over a warranty on the quality of tires. In
discussing the raison d'etre for government regulation of insurance, the court said: "Laws
regulating and supervising those engaged in the business of insurance were enacted
chiefly in the interest of the people to make it as certain as possible that the fund created
by their contributions would be held, managed and disbursed in a prudent and proper
manner." State ex rd. Herbert v. Standard Oil Co., supra at 381, 35 N.E.2d at 440.
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denominated the control test, focuses upon the ability of the alleged
insurer effectively to regulate the happening of the insured event, thus
eliminating the element of fortuity. 12 There is little or nothing in the
body of cases applying the control test which is helpful in defending
noninsured employee benefit programs against attack by state insur-
ance commissioners. Death, illness and injury caused by accident—all
traditional subjects of employee benefit plans—are by definition events
of destiny and not design.
The second test, the primary purpose test, questions the need for
bringing a given set of facts within the ambit of state regulation by
focusing on the objectives of the challenged transaction." As such, it
moves beyond the more or less formalistic control analysis, and because
of this, lacks the precision and predictability many wish to see in rules
of law. Using this approach, a substantially persuasive argument can
be made in favor of the validity of noninsured employee benefit pro-
grams outside the scope of state regulation.
First, of course, is the proposition that programs of this kind are
nothing more than incidents of the employment contract by which
an employer hopes to get better services from its employees.' They
are a form of compensation. As one court has said of a company-oper-
ated contributory retirement plan, it was merely "one aspect of the
company's employer-employee relations, a method by which it assumes
an expense to facilitate its business and compensates its employees
for services. . . ."" If such be the attitude of a court as to pension
plans which are noninsured, no sound reason appears for distinguishing
medical, accident or any other benefit program.
Performance of the employer's obligations depends upon its sol-
vency, just as does its ability to pay wages which have been earned.
No legislation has ever been proposed that would subject the business
12 It has been used most frequently in deciding cases involving sales promotional
schemes, such as warranties to replace damaged or lost goods. State ex rel. Herbert v.
Standard Oil Co., supra note 11. Cf. State ex rel. Duffy v. Western Auto Supply Co.,
134 Ohio St. 163, 16 N.E.2d 256 (1938).
13 In the leading group health case, the court said:
That an incidental element of risk distribution or assumption may be present
should not outweigh all other factors. If attention is focused only on that feature,
the line between insurance or indemnity and other types of legal arrangement
and economic function becomes. faint, if not extinct . . . . The question turns,
not on whether risk is involved or assumed, but on whether that or something
else to which it is related in the particular plan is its principal object and
purpose.
Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 247-48 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
11 E.g., California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 151
Cal. App. 2d 559, 312 P.2d 19 (1957), wherein the court commented that a retirement
plan to which employees contributed was neither insurance nor an annuity, but rather a
program for improvement of employee services and relations.
15 State Tax Comm'n v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 341 Mass. 555, 563, 170
N.E.2d 711, 716 (1960).
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community in general to the detailed and intense regulation familiar
in insurance in order to assure employees the payment of their wages,
so it would seem to follow that a 'mere incident of the employment
contract is not as a matter of public policy in need of strict state
supervision. The fact that some employers will miscalculate their finan-
cial depth is not itself a reason to bring this area of their activity
within insurance regulation. Insurers, too, have been known to fail.
Marketing practices are a second major distinction. They are
substantially different from those normally used in selling insurance,
and these dissimilarities serve to minimize the need for state regulation.
Two characteristics of the programs stand out. Protection avail-
able through employee benefit plans is neither offered to the public
generally nor marketed for profit. While probably these points alone
would be insufficient to save an otherwise susceptible transaction from
coming within the insurance laws, they do have a cumulative impact,
and have been the subject of judicial comment in decisions sustaining
the validity of cognate programs unsuccessfully contested as insur-
ance. Only recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
had occasion to consider a death benefit program available only to
members of the municipal police force. In approving the noninsured
plan, it was emphasized that the association conducting it did not solicit
public membership, and that its ranks were limited." The relevance of
both points to the present discussion is self-evident.
As to the absence of a profit objective, there is strong judicial
language to the effect that this will save a noninsured program from
coming within regulatory insurance laws. Perhaps the strongest state-
ment is found in a provocative, but well-reasoned, California case in
which an insurance company sought to recover premium taxes paid on
contributions received from its employees to the company retirement
plan. Without equivocation, it wrote:
to Metropolitan Police Retirement Ass'n v. Tobriner, 306 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
The court stated:
They [the statutes] assume a separateness of identity, diversity of ownership,
public solicitation of business, and probable conflict of interest between insurer
and insured, necessitating regulation for the latter's protection. When the pur-
poses for which these regulations were enacted have no significance in a particular
situation this serves as a guide in determining whether a particular activity is not
within the regulations. The Association does not solicit public membership, its
ranks are limited, and its investments are controlled by the membership. The
bylaws provide that investments of funds shall not only be approved by a
majority of the Board of Directors, but also by a majority vote of the member-
ship in regular session. The absence of a profit motive and the facts that the
Association possesses a representative government and engages in no solicitation
of the public, add some though not controlling support to the view that its
activities are not within the scope of a statute primarily designed to protect the
insured vis-a-vis the insurer.
Metropolitan Police Retirement Ass'n v. Tobriner, supra at 778.
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Regardless of the noted similarities in so many of the pro-
visions contained in the plan to those found in annuity policies
regularly sold by insurers, the great dissimilarity which
inheres in the total absence of profit motive—never ignored
by successful insurers—compels a conclusion that the es-
tablishment and maintenance of respondent's employees'
retirement plan cannot be classified as insurance business
done by it in this state. Such was not its purpose and such
was not its nature.n
To this reasoning of the California court, there is the rebuttal
that the presence or absence of profit is irrelevant to the purpose of
government regulation. There is some inconsistency in arguing that
regulation may be avoided by conceiving a plan in which funds re-
ceived are designedly inadequate to provide .a profit: 8 Mutual com-
panies, which theoretically by-pass the profit objective, are nonetheless
subject to regulation. Perhaps what the court was impressed with was
the noncommercial nature of the plan, the absence of a profit objective
being but one of several attributes so distinguishing the plan as to
insulate it from state regulation.
Noninsured employee benefit programs may be further distin-
guished from insurance by the inadequacy or total absence of an
employee contribution. In very few instances is the entire cost of an
employee plan carried by employee contributions, although it is prob-
ably more common than not for them to make some payment. The
absence of a contribution tends to strengthen the arguments for the
legality of the plan, because it makes available the contention that
one of the essential elements of insurance—a premium--is lacking.
Providing for contributions does not necessarily impair the plan, for
contributions "markedly lower" than premiums for commercially avail-
able coverage have been the basis for saving plans from regulation."
17 California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra note 14,
at 561, 312 P.2d at 20.
is Cf. N.Y. Ins. Law 	 41(4) which provides that the absence of profit shall not
conclusively establish that a transaction is not insurance.
19 California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra note 14,
where the court observed that the employee contributions
were markedly lower than amounts which would have to be paid under formal
group annuity policies to a company issuing the same, whether paid wholly or
partly by employer and employee and that, viewed in this way, employee con-
tributions were not calculated by actuarial methods used in the insurance world.
Thus it was shown that where actuaries calculating the premiums on insurance
contracts, whether of the life or of the annuity type, consider three elements,
namely, the rate of mortality, the rate of interest and the rate of expense, the
amount of contributions by respondent's employees were arrived at by non-
actuarial methods. For instance, employee contributions varied according to
amount of salary or wages earned and to that extent were arbitrary rather than
actuarial, and the gap between the cost of the plan and the employee's hid
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One weakness of this contention lies in the fact that an employee's
services may be regarded as a "payment". Money is not the only thing
of value, nor the only recognized form of premium." This very point
was forcefully made by the country's highest court in Haynes v. United
States,' a case in which, ironically, the government lawyers had to
argue that a noninsured sick pay plan was not insurance. The Supreme
Court said that payment of premiums in a fixed amount at regular
intervals is not a necessary element of insurance, and added that the
employment itself was sufficient to satisfy the formal requisite of con-
sideration to make the agreement binding." However, it is one thing
to construe "insurance" for purposes of the tax laws, and quite another
to do it so as to permit state regulation of a private corporate activity.
The fact remains that courts have indicated that dollar premiums and
the creation of investment income are essential characteristics of the
business of insurance."
The preceding judicial evaluations distinguishing noninsured em-
ployee benefit plans from insurance appear to state that from a public
policy perspective, the need for government regulation must be proved.
There is a difference between an enterprise whose main purpose is to
assume and distribute risks and one engaged in the risk-shifting and
risk-distribution activities as a mere incident of its main business pur-
pose. There are good reasons for this disposition. An insurer's primary
source of income, and therefore the economic fountain of its financial
solvency, is premiums. Employees, on the other hand, even where they
may contribute to their benefit plan, are not their employer's principal
source of economic stability. It is, rather, the employer's business
prosperity which is important, and no amount of insurance regulation
is either intended or competent to influence this.
contributions was thus arbitrarily assumed by respondent as its contribution.
California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra at 560-61, 312
P.2d at 20. See also, Colaizzi v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 208 N.Y. 275, 101 N.E. 859
(1913).
211 Numerous statutes, e.g., N.Y. Ins. Law 41, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-102 (1960),
require that there be a conferring of a benefit of pecuniary value, or of money or its
equivalent. There are some decisions, however, where the payment of money has seemed
to be regarded as essential for a contract of insurance. Denton v. Ware, 228 S.W.2d 867
(Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
21 353 U.S. 81 (1957).
22 The payment of premiums in a fixed amount at regular intervals is not a
necessary element of insurance. Similarly there is no necessity for a definite fund
set aside to meet the insurer's obligations. And the fact that the amount and
duration of benefits increased with the length of time that an employee worked
. . . reflected the added value to the company of extra years of experience and
service.
Haynes v. United States, supra note 21, at 84.
23 Bowers v. Lawyers Mortgage' Co., 285 U.S. 182 (1932). "'Premiums' are charac-
teristic of the business of insurance, and the creation of 'investment income' is generally,
if not necessarily, essential to it." Id. at 189.
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ATTORNEYS GENERAL RULINGS
Besides those courts which have had occasion to examine non-
insured employee benefit plans, attorneys general in three states—New
York,' California' and Florida 26—have written opinions excluding
them from insurance regulation. As might be expected, the reasons
given vary. The New York ruling is not particularly relevant to the
precise question at hand, since it was predicated upon an express pro-
vision of the insurance law exempting labor unions." The California
attorney general gave the most comprehensive study to the issue, and
while several reasons were assigned for excluding these plans from
regulation, the thrust of the opinion lay in the assessment that such
programs are an incident of employment, or of union membership
where carried on solely by a union. 28
OTHER SUGGESTIONS
The broadest assault on behalf of the exclusion of these plans
from state supervision under insurance laws is undoubtedly found in
the "main purpose" argument outlined above, for it clashes with the
threshold question of the need for government regulation. Prevail here,
and any traditional form of employee benefit plan almost certainly
will successfully avoid the grip of state‘control. Failure, however, does
not mean that all routes are closed, save those of submission to regu-
lation or funding through a duly licensed insurer. Cases dealing with
a definition of insurance suggest the following considerations:
1. Recite in the plan that no enforceable rights in favor of em-
ployees are being created, or that whatever obligation does exist, it is
limited to the availability of funds as they accumulate under the plan.
This was the basis of the Florida attorney general ruling, and appar-
ently is based upon the elimination of any misplaced reliance by the
employee on the presumed financial soundness of the source of his
protection.
2. Construct a plan which is purely voluntary, to which no em-
ployee contributions are made, and which by express provision may
be modified or terminated at the sole discretion of the employer. Courts
agree that no contractual relations with employees arise under these
24 Ops. N.Y. Att'y Gen., Nov. 21, 1956.
25 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen., No. 57/158, Dec. 8, 1958. "[Tihe prevailing judicial climate
does not indicate that the California courts would interpret such direct payment to
employees or their beneficiaries . . . as constituting the fund or employer or labor union
an insurance company or as constituting a violation of the provisions of the Insurance
Code. The tendency of the decisions has been the other way."
26 Ops. Fla. Att'y Gen., No. 057 -360 (1957). •
27 N.Y. Ins. Law § 466.
28 See note 25 supra.
242
NONINSURED EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS
terms, and without a contract there can be no insurance." The obvious
practical limitation is that most employee benefit plans are, either as
a result of a collective bargaining agreement or other term of employ-
ment, designed to confer enforceable rights.
3. Design a plan offering benefits in the form of services rather
than the payment of money. This distinction, though subject to criti-
cism, is well established in the annals of insurance litigation, and is the
basis of many cases holding that hospital and medical service organi-
zations are not engaged in the insurance business."
4. Consider the feasibility of some form of statutorily exempt
plan, either under state or federal law. Statutory exemptions differ
from state to state, but the principal arguments here are derived from
the disclosure laws of some states and of the federal Taft-Hartley
ouster of state jurisdiction to regulate Taft-Hartley funds under sec-
tion 302(c)." The rationale under state disclosure laws is that such
statutes impliedly exempt employee welfare and pension plans from
supervision under insurance laws because of the alternate route of
disclosure."
5. Consider the feasibility of establishing a trustee-administered
plan, under which the obligations of the employer run to the trust, of
which the employees are beneficiaries. Taft-Hartley section 302(c)
funds are of this kind. This form allows for the technical contention
that the employees, being beneficiaries of a trust, are not in a contrac-
tual relation with their employer, and therefore no insurance contract.
exists. The reasoning is not altogether persuasive, and the very prac-
tical limitation is that the final responsibility for administration is
taken out of the hands of the employer and transferred to the trustees,
who, at least in the case of the Taft-Hartley trust, included an equal
number of union representatives.
CONCLUSION
The future of noninsured employee benefit plans lies in very
muddied waters. Since important interests of several major groups
20 Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1 Ill. App. 2d 514, 117 N.E.2d 880
(1954).
so E.g., Michigan Hospital Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954).
For criticisms of the distinction between service and insurance in the context of these
hospital or medical service cases, see Notes, 55 Comm. L. Rev. 109 (1955), 53 Mich. L.
Rev. 484 (1955), 39 Minn. L. Rev. 218 (1955), all dealing with Michigan Hospital Serv.
v. Sharpe.
31 E.g., Cal. Ins. Code § 699 exempts, "Trustees of a fund established by one em-
ployer, or by one or more employers in the same industry, or by one or more labor
unions, or by one or more employers and one or more labor unions, to insure employees
of the employers or members of the unions for the benefit of persons other than the
employers or the unions." See also, Cal. Ins. Code El 10505, 10494.5,7.
32 E.g., Ops. N.Y. Att'y Gen., Nov. 21, 1956. Cf. N.Y. Ins. Law § 370.
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are in competition one with the other, it is a likelihood that before
long these plans will soon be before the courts for identification as
insurance or not insurance.
So long as the business community sees in these plans an oppor-
tunity to earn money by saving it, so long will the urge to noninsure
continue. The situation currently existing in Illinois, where one or two
plans have been approved, but future approvals have been at least
temporarily foreclosed, obviously cannot persist. Too much money is
involved for the precluded competitor to remain silent.
The route of state-by-state legislation to remove "existing inequi-
ties in regulation, taxation or otherwise" is at best slow and spotty.
The insurance industry would like to take this road, and a major start
has been made with legislation having been introduced in the 1963
legislative sessions of California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Pennsylvania and the key state of New York." While pushing the
cause on the legislative front, insurers must continue to be responsive
to the pressures of their clients. Therefore, it may be expected that
more and more carriers and an increasing number of companies will
work out employee benefit programs involving noninsurance concepts.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners, in the
meantime, has made known its dislike of the trend to noninsurance in
the employee benefit area." The move it feels has two possible conse-
quences for state commissioners. One, if it is successful, control over a
major area of regulation will be lost, and two, if it is lost on the local
- level, there arises the head of the specter of federal intervention, such
as through disclosure laws. This latter is especially distasteful to state
supervisors and to the insurance industry in general, both of which
for over a century have learned to live in relative harmony, almost
completely free from higher powers in Washington.
The preceding discussion has been designed primarily to point
out the many problems encountered when considering whether to insti-
tute a noninsurance program and particularly to focus on the newly
risen, inherent issue of their legality. The debate, just getting under-
way, surely will increase, and in the years just ahead it must be re-
solved in either the courts, legislatures or both.
33 Supra, note 6.
34 Resolution, Uninsured and Partially Uninsured Non-Regulated Employee Welfare
and Pension Plans, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Annual Meeting,
December 1962. "Any existing inequities in regulation, taxation or otherwise, which would
induce the adoption of noninsured plans in the employee benefit field" should be supported
for removal. See also, Future of Private Insurance in Big Group Cases Tied to Tax Bill
in Next N.Y. Legislature, The National Underwriter, Aug. 10, 1963, p. 1, col. 1.
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